















































Argentina, once a prominent example of the ‘Washington consensus’, took dramatic steps to reduce 
its integration in the world economy in the aftermath of the peso crisis in 2001. This pattern might 
suggest that the Argentine government would turn aggressively to contingent protection measures 
such as antidumping and safeguards in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis. The data suggest 
that the share of imports subject to ongoing Argentine contingent protection measures (especially 
antidumping) has increased from about 1.2% of total imports in 2006 to about 2.7% in 2009. If one 
considers the impact of suppressed imports, this rises to an estimated 5% in 2009. Argentine 
antidumping use has retained its focus on developing countries. However, while in earlier periods 
Brazil was the most frequent target, almost all of the recent antidumping activity has been focused 
very narrowly on China, a pattern that predates the 2008 crisis. While Argentina has certainly become 
more aggressive in its use of antidumping since the 1990s, there is little to suggest that it has done so 
specifically in the wake of the crisis. Instead, Argentine import restrictions are increasingly focused 
on China alone.   
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  Argentina’s economy came under considerable stress in 2008 as the global financial crisis 
swept the world. Argentine economic growth stumbled as exports fell dramatically and credit markets 
dried up worldwide. This economic distress raised the specter of a renewed inward protectionist 
approach that Argentina has followed so frequently in times of severe downturn. In the event, there 
is evidence that the Argentine government began to use temporary trade barriers (TTBs) more 
intensely in 2008 through the first half of 2010. One estimate suggests that, taking into account 
suppression of trade associated with the import restrictions, over 5% of Argentine imports were 
affected by such contingent protection measures in 2009, which is far in excess of any earlier period. 
TTBs have been particularly common against Chinese exports to Argentina. However, there is less 
evidence of a systematically more protectionist approach by Argentina in the post-crisis period using 
transparent trade restrictions such as increased MFN tariffs. There has been a greater use of opaque 
measures such as non-automatic import licenses and reference prices, though the broader impact of 
such policies remains murky.  
  Argentina’s experience is one that can provide important insights into the use of WTO-
consistent trade restrictions in times of turmoil. Argentina has a long and complicated relationship 
with trade protection and with the use of contingent protection measures from the early 1990s 
through the first decade of the 2000s. In the last 25 years, Argentina has whipsawed back and forth 
from a highly protected economy with a reliance on import-substitution through the early 1980s, to a 
dramatically more open model in the late 1980s through unilateral trade liberalisation, and then back 
again to a more inward-focused approach in the early years of the 2000s. During that time, it has 
faced economic shocks from both international and domestic sources. This includes a severe balance 
of payments crisis and subsequent devaluation of the peso in the 2001-2 period as well as the 
consequences of the international crisis that began in 2008. 
In the post-2008 crisis period, economic disruptions in Argentina grew as in the rest of the 
world. Annual Argentine GDP growth fell significantly from 6.8% in 2008 to 0.9% in 2009 as the 
crisis that began in developed countries moved towards developing countries.
1 Unemployment rose 
from 7.3% in 2008 to 8.4% in 2009. The pressures on the trade side were evident as well. Argentine 
                                                        
1 World Development Indicators is the source for all macroeconomic data while the United Nations COMTRADE is 
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merchandise exports fell 20% from $70 billion in 2008 to $55.7 billion in 2009. The slower economic 
growth resulted in an even more dramatic 29% drop in imports from $54.3 billion in 2008 to $38.3 
billion in 2009. Given the sharp drop in economic growth and the contemporaneous Argentine 
government’s skepticism towards laissez-faire policies, one might expect a strong reaction in trade 
policy.  
  The analysis below will show two important features. The first is that the total amount of 
trade affected by ongoing TTBs in Argentina rose significantly in the post-crisis period. Second, 
Argentine temporary trade barriers have become less and less about industries traditionally targeted 
by such measures (such as steel) and more and more about restrictions on Chinese exports in a 
variety of industries. Such data patterns mean that it is difficult to know yet with certainty whether 
this increased use of contingent protection is a move against China or a more general reaction to the 
broader economic crisis. 
This paper includes a section on the broad trade policy context in Argentina in Section 2, 
followed by a discussion in Section 3 of basic descriptive statistics of antidumping and safeguard use.
2 
Section 4 includes a more detailed analysis of the amount of trade affected by the measures, Section 5 
a more detailed discussion of Argentina’s experience with China, and Section 6 a brief discussion of 
other trade policy measures such as import licenses and adjustments of applied tariffs. Section 7 
contains the concluding remarks.  
 
2 Broad Trade Overview 
Argentina was one of the most consistent practitioners of import substitution policies in 
Latin America through the mid-1980s. For example, Nogues and Baracat (2006) report that average 
Argentine applied ad valorem tariffs reached 39% in 1987, with about 50% of tariff lines subject to 
import licenses. Starting in 1988, Argentina began a remarkable unilateral trade liberalisation package 
that subsequently resulted in average applied tariffs of only 12% with no products subject to import 
licenses. 
  Argentina has long had a system of TTBs, even prior to the liberalization episode in the 
1980s. It adopted an antidumping (AD) system in 1972 (Zanardi, 2004) that would allow for 
                                                        
2 Argentina has also intervened frequently in its export markets, primarily through export taxes and quotas in order to 
moderate domestic price increases. This tendency has been particularly acute in agricultural markets like beef and wine. 
While important in understanding the broadest story about trade policy, this paper is focused on interventions in the 
import side alone. See Rossi et al (2009) for an analysis of Argentine export policies and Global Trade Alert for a catalog of 
actions in the crisis period. 4 
 
individual industries to file for temporary protection through this administered protection system. It 
also instituted systems that allow countervailing duties (CVDs) in the event of subsidised exports for 
narrowly defined product areas as well as broad industry-level restrictions from all sources in the 
event of import surges that result in ‘serious’ injury (safeguards).
3 The Argentine system included a 
central role by CNCE (Comisión Nacional de Comercio Exterio), which is the administrative body 
responsible for investigating dumping and injury allegations filed by domestic industries.    
  Argentina certainly has one of the longest histories of intense use of potentially WTO-
consistent contingent protection measures among developing countries. This has been primarily 
through the use of antidumping; Prusa (2001) shows that Argentina was the second most frequent 
new user of antidumping in the 1990s. On the other hand, Argentina’s authorities used safeguards 
and CVD actions against importers very infrequently. Thus, while this paper will include analysis of 
safeguard actions, the focus will be on antidumping as the primary example of Argentina’s temporary 
trade barriers.
4 
  Based on what took place after the peso crisis in 2001-2, one might have expected a marked 
increase in protectionist measures in Argentina after the economic crisis that began in late 2008. 
There was indeed an uptick in the use of new contingent protection measures during the global 
economic crisis, though there were no new CVDs or safeguard actions. There is strong evidence that 
the overall impact of antidumping actions, measured by the share of trade affected by ongoing AD 
orders, grew substantially in Argentina in 2008 and 2009. As discussed below, this reflects that 
Argentine authorities have become much more likely to impose an antidumping order after an 
initiation and are far less likely to remove them after the five-year period as envisioned by 
international antidumping agreements negotiated in the Uruguay Round. 
  However, there was relatively little broad new retrenchment against imports during the 2008-
9 period, including only a modest increase in applied tariffs which Argentina could have raised 
significantly given its tariff overhang. This of course reflects Argentina’s membership in 
                                                        
3 See Nogues and Baracat (2006) for details on the antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard systems in Argentina. 
4 Argentina, like the vast majority of WTO members, has initiated only a handful of countervailing duty investigations (ie 
actions taken against potentially injurious imports that have received subsidies from a government). In particular, there 
have been a total of only six CVD investigations undertaken by the Argentine government, all but one of which involved 
agricultural goods. These cases also represent a very small percentage of trade affected by TTBs; the greatest percentage 
was in 1997 when only 6% of trade affected by contingent protection, or only 0.02% of total trade, involved CVD 
measures. 5 
 
MERCOSUR, which makes unilateral increases in applied MFN tariffs problematic.
5 There has been 
an increase of other types of tariff barriers, including non-automatic import licenses. One of the 
difficulties is their opaque nature; import licenses have uncertain effects on trade flows since they 
depend on how bureaucracies implement the restrictions.   
  Table 1 displays some basic information about the Argentine economy from 1991 through 
2009, including data on the annual GDP growth rate, the exchange rate (pesos per ‘special drawing 
rights’), and the current account as a share of GDP. Argentina’s economic growth has been highly 
volatile during the period. Economic growth was quite strong during the early 1990s as the country 
embarked on its remarkable economic liberalisation program. This was followed by a sharp 
contraction in 1999 during the aftermath of the Brazilian and Russian crises, and an even greater 
decline in 2001 and 2002 during the peso crisis. The nominal exchange rate reflects this currency 
turmoil with a dramatic devaluation in 2002 followed by a slowly depreciating peso thereafter. The 
current account as a percentage of GDP has been in surplus for the entire period subsequent to the 
devaluation. The 2008-9 global financial crisis period reflects a sharp slowdown in growth (from 
6.8% in 2008 to 0.9% in 2009) but with a retained current account surplus and a depreciating 
exchange rate.   
Table 1 also includes the number of newly initiated antidumping investigations in each year, ie 
the number of country-product petitions filed by the Argentine industry. Thus, an antidumping 
petition against Swiss ‘laminated floors’, which might involve myriad individual tariff lines, is counted 
as one ‘investigation’, which is the literature’s traditional way to count antidumping activity. 
There are two clear patterns for antidumping activity. The first is the increased use of 
antidumping in the years prior to the balance of payments crisis in 2001-2. The Argentine peso 
became significantly overvalued in the late 1990s and early 2000s as Argentina experienced a large 
and persistent current account deficit. Argentine use of antidumping rose to its highest rate 
(measured by the number of investigations initiated) in this period; industries effectively used the 
antidumping system to decrease imports. Antidumping initiations fell dramatically in 2002 to fewer 
than half of the 2000 total, which coincided with a massive 10.9% contraction of the economy.   
The experience in the post-devaluation period shows that a sharp slowdown in 
macroeconomic growth is not sufficient to trigger antidumping use in Argentina. The main mitigating 
                                                        
5 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay are the members of MERCOSUR, a customs union that in principle requires 
common tariffs on non-members and zero tariffs among member nations. 6 
 
factor was the dramatic 56% fall in imports that occurred in the post-devaluation period, which 
normally makes proving that imports have caused material injury more difficult for petitioning 
domestic industries. 
The post-2007 period provides a slightly different lesson. Antidumping use rose three-fold 
from 2007 and 2009 in terms of initiated investigations, even as the peso continued to depreciate and 
imports fell. In this period, and in contrast to the years immediately following the peso devaluation, 
the dramatic reduction in economic activity coincided with a rise in AD use.
6 Table 2 includes a list 
of initiated antidumping investigations from January 2008 through March 2010. As illustrated by the 
table, China was clearly the prominent target, a pattern discussed in more detail below. 
It will be useful to consider how applied tariffs in sectors affected by all types of TTBs 
compare to tariffs in sectors that are free from these types of restrictions. Figure 1 shows that the 
average (unweighted) applied MFN tariffs in sectors that were subject to TTBs in any year of the 
sample always exceed the average tariffs of all sectors for 1995 through 2009.
7 In other words, those 
sectors that use contingent protection already have higher than average tariffs for all years in the data. 
This suggests that sectors that have been subject to less dramatic tariff reductions have also been the 
most active in seeking additional protection. One interpretation of this data is that in Argentina, 
TTBs and MFN tariffs could be considered complements rather than substitutes. 
Another important trade policy change was Argentina’s 1991 decision to join MERCOSUR, a 
customs union, along with Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. MERCOSUR entailed a common external 
tariff that was completed by the end of 1994. Four aspects of this agreement are particularly 
important. First, the customs union means that imports from other MERCOSUR countries would 
normally enter Argentina without restrictions.
8 Second, the common external tariff means that 
Argentina would be limited in its ability to increase its MFN tariffs on non-MERCOSUR countries. 
While Argentina might have other methods (eg non-automatic import licenses, regulatory practices, 
internal taxation, and contingent protection measures) to reduce imports, their impact would be more 
limited than what Argentina might otherwise impose. Third, the Treaty of Asuncion and subsequent 
trade policy arrangement among MERCOSUR countries had important implications for the use of 
contingent measures such as TTBs. For example, the treaty did not allow for a safeguard for intra-
                                                        
6 Data for 1991 through 1994 comes from Moore and Zanardi (2009); the balance is from Bown (2010b).  
7 Note that the average tariffs in TTB sectors do not reflect any additional trade restrictions from contingent protection. 
8 The applied MFN tariffs in Figure 1 do not reflect lower tariffs for MERCOSUR countries or other countries with 
which Argentina now has preferential tariffs such as Colombia.   7 
 
MERCOSUR trade, unlike the ‘snapback’ provisions of NAFTA. The treaty also permitted the 
continued use of antidumping and countervailing duty actions against MERCOSUR partners. Finally, 
all three contingent protection measures are administered by Argentina alone for its imports—there 
are no formal MERCOSUR-level AD, CVD or safeguard measures.  
 
3 Descriptive Statistics on Temporary Trade Barriers (1991-2010) 
Table 3 shows the simple count of antidumping actions (both those initiated and those 
resulting in measures) for the 1991 through 2010 period.
9 Note that since antidumping authorities 
may take more than a year to complete an antidumping investigation, most of the investigations 
initiated in 2009 and 2010 had not been finalized by the time this study was completed. The unit of 
observation for these counts is the number of cases at the Harmonised System 8-digit level (HS-08).
10 
Counting antidumping frequency is complicated. Each instance involves a specific exporting 
country and a ‘product’ under investigation. However, each ‘product’ may include literally dozens of 
HS-08 tariff line codes for each target country’s exporters under investigation.
 Going forward, 
‘investigation’ will refer to a particular country and group of products investigated by the authorities, 
eg ‘hot rolled steel products’ from Slovakia. A ‘case’ will refer to each country-tariff line combination, 
eg 7208.27.10 and 7208.27.90 from Slovakia will be considered two cases even if part of the same 
investigation. Since antidumping analysis traditionally has taken place at the ‘investigation’ level but 
most of the analysis in this paper will be at the ‘case’ level, one should be careful when making 
comparisons of antidumping statistics across this and other studies. The current dataset, for example, 
has 317 initiated investigations with 933 individual exporter-HS-08 code pairs. Table 1 includes 
investigation level data while Table 3 is at the case level. 
  Table 3 shows jurisdictions most involved in Argentina’s antidumping actions in the dataset. 
China, Brazil, and the European Union alone are the targets in 435 out of 933 cases. Exports from 
China have been the single most frequent target of antidumping actions, with 188 individual products 
facing AD actions, or 20% of all cases. Exports from Brazil are just behind with 167 cases. The EU-
15 countries as a group have the third largest number of antidumping cases with 80 AD cases 
                                                        
9 Information about TTB actions used in this study end in July 2010 when the database developed by Bown (2010b) was 
updated as of January 2011. 
10 HS refers to the harmonised tariff classification system. ‘HS-02’ and ‘HS-08’ refer to the two- and eight-digit 
categories.  8 
 
initiated by Argentine authorities.
11 More disaggregated data shows that Argentina has focused 
primarily on developing country exports for the entire period: only 151 of the 940 cases involve 
exports from high-income countries such as the EU-15, Australia, the US, Switzerland, Japan, 
Canada, and New Zealand.   
Table 3b contains the outcomes for cases adjudicated to the final stage. Almost 69% of 
initiated petitions (642 out of 933) have ended with a final measure imposed. Clearly, most Argentine 
antidumping cases end in final ‘orders’ (ie antidumping measures restricting imports).
 The rest have 
been concluded without final measures—either by the withdrawal of the petitioning industry, the 
termination by the AD authorities, or decisions not yet rendered. Note the totals for 2008-10 should 
be treated with caution since many cases filed in 2009 and 2010 were not yet finalized at the time this 
study was completed. For these cases, there is strong evidence to suggest that nearly all petitions will 
likely result in final measures, in large part because Argentina has begun to impose restrictions on 
essentially all antidumping cases that involve imports from China. 
The simple count of antidumping petitions and actions does not take into account the 
‘intensity’ of AD use. In particular, it is useful to compare the percentage of antidumping petitions 
with the share of total imports from particular jurisdictions. For example, US products represented 
an average of 18.3% of total Argentine imports for 1991-2009 but only 1.6% of the total number of 
antidumping petitions at the case level (16 out of 933).
12 EU-15 trade was also targeted less (8.5% of 
total AD petitions) than expected given its overall import share (22.5%). Brazil is slightly 
unrepresented as well with 17.9% of AD petitions compared to an average of 27.3% of annual total 
imports for the period. China stands out as its annual average import share was only 5.4% for the 
entire period, but it faced 20% of the antidumping complaints. However, Chinese exports to 
Argentina were increasing dramatically during this time period.  
 
3.1 Argentine Antidumping Use Over Time: Country Patterns 
  One striking aspect of Argentina’s use of antidumping shown in Table 3 is how the pattern of 
countries targeted evolves over time. During 1991-4, Argentina initiated 153 cases on HS-08 product 
lines, and 85 of those cases ended in final antidumping orders. In other words, during this period of 
                                                        
11 EU-15 nations are used instead of the current 27 member states of the EU for consistency across the years analyzed in 
the study.  
12 Trade data for 2010 was not available at the time this study was completed. 9 
 
economic and trade liberalisation, Argentine authorities were quite stringent in their administration of 
the antidumping laws, with high standards before a final antidumping order would be imposed. 
  Brazil was by far the single most frequent target with 56 total cases, representing one-third of 
all initiations in 1991-4. US exports, in contrast, were involved in only 5 cases. The EU-15 countries 
lag far behind as well with only 19 cases. East Asian imports were only lightly touched: the numbers 
for Japan (3), South Korea (6), and Taiwan (2) are much smaller than in traditional AD users like the 
US during the 1990s. Strikingly, China only had 7 HS-08 codes involved in the Argentine AD system 
during this early period. Argentine authorities targeted developing countries with just over one-third 
of antidumping petitions in this period, with the balance focused on high-income countries. 
  Argentina’s use of AD surged in the next period (1995-2001). A combination of Argentina’s 
liberal economic regime and integration within WTO bound tariffs, MERCOSUR membership, a 
fixed peg to the US dollar, and the Brazilian devaluation put enormous pressure on import-
competing industries, as reflected in the current account deficits displayed in Table 1. As Nogues and 
Baracat (2006) point out, these industries turned more and more frequently to antidumping as a 
means to limit foreign sales since their traditional means of protection (eg import license regimes and 
high MFN tariffs) were unavailable. In particular, there were 467 individual HS-08 codes from 
various countries involved in the antidumping cases that Argentina initiated during this period, and 
final antidumping orders covered 377 of these products.  
  Argentina’s antidumping cases became even more focused on developing countries during 
the 1995-2001 period, with twice as many initiated against this group than against high-income 
countries. This period also saw particular pressures on Brazilian exports that faced 82 initiated cases. 
The period also begins the intense focus on China with 46 petitions. The emergence of China as a 
target for Argentina is consistent with other related research, though the focus on Brazil is far more 
unusual. US exporters continue to be rare targets of AD in Argentina, despite the large share of its 
imports in the Argentine market. 
  There was another dramatic change in AD use during 2002-7 (after the peso crisis and before 
the international financial crisis that begin in 2008). Even though the Argentine government took a 
number of steps to reduce its integration into the world economy during this period, the number of 
Argentine AD case initiations dropped from an average of almost 60 HS-08 products per year in 
1995-2001 to just over 20 products per year in 2002-7. Cases brought against its MERCOSUR 
partner Brazil, an upper-middle income country, dropped from 82 in the earlier period to only 12 in 10 
 
the latter period. Cases against China fell by a much smaller margin from 46 to 23 in the latter period. 
Actions taken against higher-income country exports faded into insignificance; only one case was 
brought against the US (which did not result in a final measure) and only 8 against all EU-15 
countries. On the other hand, developing countries were now targeted in 60% of all Argentine AD 
actions. In short, Argentine AD activities in this period turned more and more against developing 
and emerging market economies, with special attention to China. 
  Recall from Table 1 that the 2002-7 period was one of significant economic volatility for 
Argentina. Imports and economic growth fell dramatically in 2002 while antidumping activity was 
reduced to a near standstill. In other words, an economic slowdown, even a dramatic one, was not a 
sufficient condition for antidumping use to increase. Perhaps most importantly, the relieved pressure 
on importers due to the devaluation of the peso meant that Argentina’s import-competing industries 
did not turn to administered protection methods such as antidumping to deal with their economic 
problems. Of course, the concurrent convulsions related to Argentina’s domestic economic problems 
meant that firms had few resources to take on the legal costs of filing an antidumping case, regardless 
of the likelihood of final success; firms were often fighting for mere survival during the crisis. 
  Does Argentina’s experience with the earlier 2001-2 economic crisis serve as a useful 
predictor of antidumping use in the post-2007 period? There was a marked increase in antidumping 
during the pre-peso crisis period and then a sharp decline afterwards, even as the economy 
contracted and imports fell. In general, the period of the recent global financial crisis suggests broad 
economic patterns similar to the peso crisis period, but on a much less dramatic scale. There was a 
significant slowdown in Argentina’s GDP growth from 2008 (6.8%) to 2009 (0.9%) and a 30% fall in 
imports from 2008 ($54.3 billion) to 2009 ($38.3 billion).  
  Nevertheless, the pattern of reduced antidumping activity observed in the post-2002 period is 
not matched by the post-2007 period. Argentina initiated 179 cases from 2008 through July 2010. 
This translates into just under 72 cases per year (counting 2010 as one-half of a year). This is greater 
than the pre-peso crisis period of 1995-2001 and far above the rate of initiation that Argentina 
experienced after the 2002 devaluation.   
There are, however, two important differences between these two periods of economic 
contraction. First, the position of the Argentine currency is quite different in the two recessions. The 
spectacular devaluation in 2002 was not repeated in the 2008-9 period. Moreover, the real exchange 
rate appreciation that was so disruptive in the lead-up to 2002 is absent in the 2008-9 crisis. In fact, 11 
 
Table 1 shows that there was an increase in the Argentine current account surplus in 2008 and 2009 
indicating that broad import pressures were falling. Second, the rise of China as a major source of 
Argentine imports does not have an analog in the earlier period. 
  There is also a continued tendency for Argentina to focus less and less of its antidumping 
activities on high-income countries. In fact, there were only 9 cases brought against a member of the 
EU-15 and only 3 cases against South Korea for 2008 through the middle of 2010. There have been 
no cases filed against the US in the 2008-10 period and only one since 2002, and that particular case 
did not result in a final antidumping order. Japan similarly has escaped attention from Argentine AD 
authorities after 2002. Instead, Argentina has continued to concentrate on other developing countries 
in 2008-10, with 90% of total initiations directed against such countries and 72% against China and 
Brazil alone.  
  Chinese exports to Argentina, like in so many other countries, rose dramatically in the 2000s. 
China’s sales in Argentina rose over thirty-eight-fold from 1991 to its historic high in 2008 compared 
to only a twelve-fold increase for Brazil and seven-fold increase in imports overall (all in nominal 
terms). This alone explains some of the newfound focus on China within the Argentine AD system.
13 
The increased competition almost assuredly has resulted in increased focus on using administered 
protection to limit Chinese imports. 
  Figure 2a depicts the count of antidumping initiations at the HS-08-country level for different 
country groups including: a. developed countries, b. Brazil, c. China, and d. developing countries 
(excluding China and Brazil).
14 Developed countries played a more important role earlier in the data, 
including spikes in 1997 and the 2000-2002 periods; subsequently, there is little Argentine AD activity 
that targets developed country exports. Developing countries excluding Brazil and China were 
targeted especially in 2000, which reflects a handful of steel cases involving numerous HS-08 tariff 
lines (discussed in more detail below). The most striking feature of the figure, of course, is the 
dramatic increase in cases involving China in 2008 and 2009. This focus on China is also clear in 
Table 2; the overwhelming majority of Argentina’s AD initiations from January 2008 through March 
2010 targeted Chinese imports. 
Figure 2b shows the count of antidumping orders in place based on the same country 
breakdown. There have been a very steady number of continued orders against developed countries 
                                                        
13 Even during the 2008-9 crisis, Chinese exports fell 24% compared to a 30% overall reduction from all sources. 
14 Developed and developing country categories are based on World Bank definitions.   12 
 
beginning in 2003. The number of antidumping orders against developing countries (excluding China 
and Brazil) is also fairly steady until the rapid growth of orders against China that begins in 2007. Not 
only have there been more investigations targeting Chinese exports, but they also represent a much 
larger share of orders that continue to restrict trade.   
 
3.2 Targeted Product Sectors 
  Table 4 contains information about the most important sectors targeted under Argentine 
AD procedures. In this table, I include only the new petitions filed at the case level; success rates for 
petitions do not vary significantly across sectors. These sectors represent 67% of all Argentine AD 
cases for the 1991-2010 period.   
  The dominant sectoral users of Argentine AD over 1991-2010 are basic iron and steel (HS-
02 sector 72) and articles of iron and steel (HS-02 sector 73). Over 44% of all Argentine cases were 
in these two sectors, with the vast majority in HS-02 sector 72. The next largest sector is electrical 
machinery (HS-02 sector 85) with only 75 product-country pairs.   
  Argentina is not unusual in that the steel industry (both basic steel and articles of steel) 
traditionally has been the single biggest category targeted in antidumping. However, there is very 
little Argentine targeting of chemicals (organic and inorganic) industry imports, which has 
traditionally been the second largest category worldwide (Moore and Zanardi, 2009). 
  There is a dramatic change in Argentina’s sectoral focus over time. The focus on iron and 
steel occurs in two periods. The first is 1992-3 during a global steel crisis. This spike in cases took 
place in spite of the booming Argentine economy of that period. The second is in the late 1990s 
subsequent to the steel sector turmoil in Asia, Russia, and Brazil. This relatively large number of 
cases should be interpreted with some care. Steel cases typically involve many individual HS-08 
categories. Domestic steel industries often file these cases against multiple steel exporting countries 
simultaneously. For example, almost all of the 109 AD initiated cases in 2000 represent only four 
countries (Kazakhstan, Romania, Slovakia, and South Africa) for only one product (‘hot rolled steel 
products’) with 20 individual HS-08 codes. While 20 separate HS-08 lines certainly represent a wide 
range of steel products, this can have very different effects than cases against 40 different products 
from 2 different countries (I will take these trade effects into account in Sections 4 and 5 below). 
  The number of separate HS-02 sectors involved in antidumping has increased in the 2003-9 
period. Basic iron and steel has dropped completely out of the picture in Argentina with no petitions 13 
 
filed since 2002. Not only have the number of new antidumping orders in the Argentine steel sector 
dramatically fallen in recent years, the orders put in place during the late 1990s and early 2000s have 
largely lapsed. Instead, there are a wide variety of different HS categories now affected by 
Argentina’s AD, including footwear and electrical and mechanical machinery. This sectoral 
broadening also reflects the increasing range of products imported from China. 
 
3.3 Argentine Administration of Antidumping 
Argentine Injury and Dumping Decisions  
Broadly speaking, Argentina is like many other countries—the vast majority of investigations 
end with a positive dumping margin while a slightly lower majority results in a positive determination 
on injury.
15 Nevertheless, there has been a dramatic change in the administration of antidumping in 
Argentina over time.   
In the early 1990s, Argentine authorities were quite strict in their application of antidumping, 
which is consistent with the open economy approach adopted by Argentina during this period. As 
noted above, Nogues and Baracat (2006) argue that Argentina’s trade policymakers were able to use 
the antidumping system to effectively diffuse the pressures for broader protection in the early years 
of liberalisation.
16 For example, about one-third of all antidumping initiations from 1991 through 
1994 resulted in a final antidumping duty.
17 
Table 5 shows a breakdown of the decisions for the 1995-2008 sample.
18 The table includes 
the number of initiations in each year as well as the number that ended in either a positive dumping 
or material injury decision in a subsequent year. Note that these are based on the investigation level 
(eg hot-rolled steel sheet from Kazakhstan) rather than the individual HS-08 product level (eg twenty 
different tariff lines for each hot-rolled steel investigation for Kazakhstan) used in many of the 
tables above. This level of aggregation is appropriate because the decisions about injury and 
dumping are made at the investigation level.   
                                                        
15 Note that this discussion necessarily takes place at the investigation level, ie all HS-08 subject to the petition from the 
particular country. 
16 Miranda (2007) argues instead that the ability of Argentina to withstand pressures to use TTBs, especially 
antidumping, for protectionist purposes has been much more limited. 
17 Author’s calculations based on Argentine antidumping authorities’ annual reports. 
18 The 1991-4 investigation data from Moore and Zanardi (2009) do not include a breakdown of dumping and injury 
investigations so this information is not reported here. Any investigations for which there is not yet a final decision by 
the time this study was completed are not included.   14 
 
Argentina’s authorities exhibited a continued reluctance to approve antidumping petitions 
filed in 1995 and 1996, as 60% and 61% of investigations, respectively, resulted in a positive dumping 
decision. Positive injury decisions were even less likely with only a 40% and 30% affirmative rate for 
investigations filed in these two years. Argentine firms certainly could not presume that they would 
win an antidumping case during this period. 
  This trend changes in subsequent years as Argentine authorities became increasingly likely to 
approve petitions. Argentine authorities made a positive determination of dumping in 86% of all 
investigations initiated between 1995 and 2008. Almost 72% also resulted in a final positive injury 
decision. Clearly there is a very high probability that dumping orders will be imposed. Moreover, 
there is an upward trend. For investigations begun in 2000, 85% resulted in a positive dumping 
margin and 70% in a positive injury decision. By 2003, these percentages rose to 100% for dumping 
and remained so for the rest of the sample. A finding of injury became much more likely as well; 
85% of investigations resulted in an affirmative injury decision for investigations initiated in the 
2003-8 period, with some year-to-year variation. It is too early to ascertain what the patterns are in 
the post-crisis stage. However, there is little reason to expect that the percentage of affirmative 
investigations would decrease relative to the pre-crisis experience.    
  It is also necessary to take into account how long an antidumping measure stays in place, not 
simply the counts of new investigations. Below, I examine this in more detail, especially with regard 
to the percentage of trade affected through ongoing TTB measures. Figure 3a depicts the duration 
of Argentina’s antidumping orders at the investigation level, measured from the year in which the 
order was first imposed to the date it was revoked. Note that the duration for orders that remain in 
place as of June 2010 is included; for those instances, duration is measured up to 2010. The mean 
duration for the entire sample is 4.7 years, ie just below the 5 years suggested by the sunset review 
procedures in the Uruguay Round Antidumping Agreement. There are however many cases that 
extend far beyond the 5 years, including three steel orders of 11 years and two others of 12 years.      
Once again, there is strong evidence of important changes in the administration of 
Argentina’s AD system over time. For cases that were initiated in 1995, the average duration for 
imposed measures was 2.6 years. No order from that year remained in place after 2001, thus 
antidumping was very much a short-term trade restriction in early days of Argentina’s intensive AD 
use. This also means that Argentine antidumping cases generally did not last long enough even to be 
subject to a five-year sunset review process mandated by the Uruguay Round Antidumping 15 
 
Agreement. This puts early Argentine antidumping use in sharp contrast to the US experience; 
Moore (2006) demonstrates that the US almost always renewed its antidumping orders after five 
years during this period.   
The duration of Argentina’s antidumping orders has changed significantly during the 2000s. 
Only six cases of the cases initiated in 2001 that resulted in final dumping orders have been 
terminated as of June 2010; 13 remained in place nine years later. Only five investigations that were 
initiated after 2001 were revoked by June 2010. In other words, it is not only more likely in the first 
decade of the 2000s that an antidumping investigation will result in an imposed restriction in place, 
but antidumping orders are also more likely to remain in place for longer periods of time. Argentina 
has become much more like the US and other countries regarding the ongoing nature of antidumping 
import protection.
19   
  Figure 3b shows this dynamic. One-hundred percent of orders that came into force in 1997 
were terminated within five years (denoted by the year ‘2002’). Subsequent to 2005, there is a steady 
decrease in the number of Argentine antidumping orders removed within five years of their initial 
imposition. By 2009 (ie cases put in place in 2004), all orders exceed the five-year sunset review 
threshold. 
  In short, there is strong evidence that Argentine antidumping orders in the 2000s last longer 
than five years; nevertheless, this tendency preceded the 2008-9 international economic crisis.  
   
Antidumping Duty Level 
  The basis for the level of restrictions in antidumping actions is the dumping margin 
calculated as part of the investigation. Under the Antidumping Agreement, this represents the upper 
bound of AD duties. Calculating the average dumping margin is difficult because this margin varies 
across firms within an investigation, ie it might differ across individual Chinese footwear exporters 
involved in the same investigation. In order to get some sense of the average margin calculated by 
Argentine authorities, I use the average of the high and low margins within an investigation as 
reported in Bown (2010b).  
  The average maximum dumping margin on this basis for Argentina’s AD cases is 167% for 
the entire available dataset compared to a minimum of 96%. This means that individual foreign 
                                                        
19 See Cadot et al (2008) for a systematic analysis of many countries’ experience with antidumping duration for the 1979-
2005 period.   16 
 
firms faced minimum possible antidumping duties of almost 100% on average with much higher 
rates possible. The average maximum dumping margin for Chinese firms is much higher at 456%, 
with two notably high calculations: playing cards (2550%) and stainless steel cutlery (1450%). 
  Assessing the level of antidumping duty in place is even more complicated for Argentina. In 
the first place, Argentina uses a ‘lesser duty’ rule, which means the AD margin may not exceed the 
amount that is necessary to eliminate injury to the domestic industry. This assessment is further 
obscured by an unusual aspect of the Argentine antidumping process, ie the frequent use of 
minimum prices for imported goods subject to an AD order instead of ad valorem duties as is more 
typical across countries. If the ‘freight on board’ (FOB) price of imports is above this reference 
price, then no duty is imposed; if below, then a tariff (often a specific tariff) is imposed to eliminate 
this gap (Nogues and Baracat, p. 64). 
The data at the investigation level includes information on the type of final dumping 
measure in 152 instances. Just fewer than 60% (91 out of 152) of those investigations concluded 
with a minimum price target. An additional 8 cases were covered by a ‘price undertaking’, which is a 
similar means by which foreign firms agree to a target price in order to avoid duties. Only 53 cases 
had measures imposed as antidumping duties; 46 were ad valorem duties, and 7 were specific duties.  
  This pattern has changed somewhat over time. In the pre-2008 period, the percentage of 
price undertakings and minimum prices reached almost 70% (90 out of 129 investigations). In 2008-
9, only 9 investigations resulted in minimum prices while 14 were standard antidumping duties. This 
change could reflect a more aggressive stance towards imports; foreign firms will face duties 
regardless of their own pricing behavior as long as the antidumping order remains in place. In 
addition, a minimum price has effects similar to a quota; foreign firms are allowed to raise the price 
with the potential to benefit from an increase in quota rents.
20 
    
3.4   Safeguard Actions 
  WTO member countries can also restrict broad categories of imports, including those 
deemed traded ‘fairly’, under the safeguard provisions. Safeguards can be directed at a broad industry 
category (eg ‘steel’) from all import sources rather than a particular product as in AD or CVD cases 
                                                        
20 Moore (2005) argues however that minimum price regimes may increase the ability of domestic and foreign 
oligopolists to raise prices at the expense of domestic consumers.   17 
 
(eg ‘hot rolled steel’ of certain dimensions) from particular firms within a specific country. Safeguards 
therefore have the potential to affect a much wider range of imports than AD or CVD actions. 
For various reasons, including the high standards for WTO compliance as determined by the 
Dispute Settlement Body especially with regard to ‘serious injury’ and the possible need for 
compensation to exporting countries, safeguard use has been very infrequent relative to AD. 
Argentina is no exception to this characterisation. From 1995 to 2010, Argentina investigated only 
seven petitions for relief under its safeguard system, a list of which appears in Table 6. The list 
includes footwear (an original case initiated in 1997 plus an additional revised petition initiated in 
2000), toys, motorcycles and mopeds, peaches, color television sets, and recordable compact discs. 
All but the safeguard investigation on toys resulted in import restrictions on the broad category 
named in the petition. This table also lists the small number of Argentine CVD cases since 1995. 
Argentina does not follow a pattern sometimes seen in other nations whereby an industry 
may file a safeguard and antidumping in the same industry category. For example, a common 
occurrence in the US is for the steel industry to file many antidumping petitions simultaneously with 
a safeguard and/or CVD action. In Argentina, there is only one instance (footwear) where the same 
product is targeted across multiple TTB procedures, and even in this instance the overlap in HS-08 
codes is not complete. The Argentine industry filed safeguard cases in 1997 and 2000 in seriatum and 
then followed up with an antidumping investigation against Chinese footwear covering many of the 
same product lines in 2009. Nevertheless, the antidumping investigation was initiated six years after 
the last footwear safeguard was terminated.   
  One particularly striking aspect of Argentina’s safeguard use is that there have been no such 
petitions filed in the 2008-9 financial crisis period, contrary to what would be expected from a 
period of economic distress and increased AD activity. Overall, imports fell quite markedly from 
2008 to 2009, and one result is that it may have become difficult to find sufficient evidence to win a 
safeguard case. Argentina also has not initiated a China-specific safeguard, which is allowed under 
the provisions of China’s WTO accession. Instead, China’s exports have been affected almost 
exclusively by the use of antidumping measures during 2008-10. The bottom line is that Argentina’s 
use of traditional administered protection (ie AD, CVD, and safeguards) is dominated by the use of 
antidumping. This was true before the crisis and has continued through the global economic crisis 
that started in 2008.  
 18 
 
4 Value of Trade Affected by Argentina’s TTBs 
  The discussion thus far examines the simple counts of cases (initiations and measures 
imposed). First, this has the distinct disadvantage that one case involving millions of dollars of 
imports is counted similarly to one with only very limited trade value. I turn therefore to a trade-
weighted version of these measures in order to get a sense of the broader economic impact of 
temporary trade barriers. Second, these are ‘temporary’ barriers and consequently are removed at a 
later date, at least in principle. Thus, I use an alternative measure that takes import values into 
account when assessing the ‘stock’ of measures that varies over time as new measures are imposed 
and older measures removed. 
 
4.1 Methodology    
  I adopt a modified version of the technique discussed in Bown (2011) to measure the 
ongoing impact of contingent protection in Argentina. One version presented below contains the 
observed values of trade under an antidumping or safeguard measure as a share of total observed 
Argentine imports. The other version attempts to account for ‘predicted’ values in the absence of 
the restriction.
21 This analysis will take place at the HS-06 level rather than HS-08 because of data 
limitations. 
  As Bown (2010a) points out, the suppression of imports by trade restrictions means that 
using observed values of imports as a weight can be misleading, especially given the high level of 
restrictions found in many antidumping petitions. Thus, it is necessary to calculate an appropriate 
‘counterfactual’ to approximate what imports might have been in the absence of any import 
restriction. In an ideal world, one would calculate the ‘normal’ level of imports for each individual 
product by considering past import levels, world supply and demand elasticities, and Argentina’s 
domestic economic conditions, ie when no TTB is in place. This is a very problematic undertaking at 
the detailed HS-06 level used in this study. 
In what follows, I calculate a ‘predicted’ import value for each year in which a TTB is in 
place using a simplistic rule. The counterfactual for the first year t in which a TTB is in place is based 
on the previous year’s level of unrestricted imports. In particular, imports at the HS-06 level subject 
to a TTB in year t-1 are multiplied by git, the percentage change in overall ‘normal’ import growth 
                                                        
21 Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010) use a gravity equation approach to try to ascertain the overall trade effects of 
antidumping among intensive (or ‘heavy’) users of antidumping among developing countries. 19 
 
from year t-1 to t. The predicted level of HS-06 level imports for each industry is the maximum of 
the observed level in year t or the previous year, scaled up by the overall import growth rate. Using 
the maximum of the two ensures that the realities of the market will take precedence over any 
prediction based on overall import growth. In subsequent years of the restriction’s operation, I once 
again use the maximum of previous year’s predicted imports multiplied by git or the observed import 
levels.
22   
The ‘normal’ growth rate is calculated based on Bown (2010a). This is the simple percentage 
change for each year in ‘non-restricted’ import flows, ie all HS-06 categories not covered in AD, 
CVD, or safeguard cases in any year during 1995-2010 for any country exporting to Argentina. These 
categories are ones in which there are no direct effects of TTBs; their growth rate is taken to reflect 
the ‘normal’ rate at which imports have changed in Argentina. This growth rate may be higher or 
lower than what might be expected for an individual product subject to a TTB. However, it might 
also be expected that those sectors faced with extraordinary restrictions might have grown even 
more than those for the economy as a whole so that this is probably a conservative approach.   
When calculating the predicted share of imports affected by TTBs, the following is used. 
The numerator is the predicted value for each year for all antidumping and safeguard measures. The 
denominator is the sum of the imports not affected by a TTB in that year plus the predicted value 
for those sectors under a TTB for that same year. For the observed values, I simply use the total 
value of trade in sectors for which there is an ongoing antidumping action, divided by the observed 
value of trade. Naturally, the former measure will always exceed the latter measure since trade 
restrictions reduce the flow of goods across borders. 
 
4.2 Aggregate Effects of TTB Use 
  Figure 4 includes the combined import coverage of the stock of Argentina’s antidumping, 
safeguard, and countervailing duty actions. Note that this is not just the effect of new measures 
imposed in any particular year, but it also reflects the continued presence as well as the eventual 
revocation of the measure. One series is the ratio of observed import values of sectors subject to a 
                                                        
22 This approach may be clearer through a simple example. Suppose observed Chinese imports for a particular HS-06 
product subject to a TTB are: $100 in 2000, $120 in 2001, $50 in 2002, and $50 in 2003. Import restrictions are in place 
for 2001 through 2003. Suppose further that non-restricted import growth rates are 10% for all years. Consequently, the 
import level used in calculating this version of equation (2) from Bown (2011) would be: $100 in 2000, $120 in 2001, 
$132 in 2002, and $145.2 in 2003.   20 
 
TTB to the observed values of imports into Argentina. The other series is the predicted values of 
TTB imports as a share of predicted total imports. 
  The observed values reflect some of the patterns noted above using descriptive statistics. In 
particular, TTBs had very little impact from 1995 through 1999; only 1.5% of total observed imports 
were affected by antidumping and safeguards by 1999. This rose to 2.6% by 2001, ie the year of 
maximum stress associated with the overvalued peso. Affected imports remained below 2% for 
Argentina up until 2008. Through the global economic crisis period, the observed share of imports 
affected by TTBs rose to 2.8% by 2008 and then to 2.7% by 2009.  
  However, there are indications that these simple statistics may significantly underestimate the 
effect of TTBs because of the suppression of imports. The counterfactual procedure described 
above results in a time series that has broadly similar patterns to the observed values through 2001 
but diverges sharply thereafter. The predicted share of affected imports rises to an early peak during 
the disruptions of the peso crisis, then falls, and then rises again in the post-global crisis period. 
However, the level is much higher than the observed value. For example, the predicted share of 
affected imports rises to 4.0% in 2003 compared to 2.0% in the observed data. After the surge of 
contingent protection measures in the 1999-2000 period, the estimated levels in subsequent years are 
nearly double the observed values. This growth reflects the effects of the greater likelihood that new 
petitions will result in new measures (see Table 5) but also that existing measures are more likely to 
remain in place (see Figure 3b).  
  Perhaps most strikingly, there is a dramatic increase in the share of imports affected by 
TTBs in the post-crisis period. In 2008, the predicted share was 4.1% and it reached 5.0% by 2009. 
This estimate suggests that Argentina was imposing TTBs in 2009 that involved almost twice as 
many imports as those affected in the immediate run-up to the peso crisis in 2002.   
However, note that there are a number of investigations initiated in 2009 that were not yet 
completed by July 2010. I assumed that all investigations filed in 2009 in fact result in antidumping 
measures.
23 This is justifiable for two reasons. First, as demonstrated in Table 5, there is a very 
strong likelihood that such measures will result in an antidumping duty. This is especially true for 
investigations involving China where the affirmative rate has essentially reached 100% in the crisis 
years, as detailed below. Second, there are likely to be trade effects even before the investigation is 
                                                        
23 Recall that 2010 import data was not available at the time of this study so that 2010 shares cannot be computed. 21 
 
completed, as noted by Staiger and Wolak (1994), so that petitions filed in 2009 are likely to have 
real trade effects in the short term even if they are not subject to a final AD restriction.  
These results are consistent with the view that Argentina’s use of TTBs may have begun to 
play a much larger role through the global economic crisis. It can be argued that this is clear 
evidence that Argentina was using antidumping measures to deal with the crisis. However, as noted 
above and discussed in more detail below, this change coincided with much more aggressive action 
with respect to China, which may have happened even in the absence of the economic crisis.   
  Figure 5 compares the predicted value of imports affected by antidumping and other TTBs. 
Antidumping has generally dominated the relative economic importance among TTBs, especially in 
late 2000s. There is, however, a surge of imports affected by safeguards that began in 1997, rose to a 
peak in 2002, and subsequently faded. This reflects the effects of three safeguard actions. The first 
two are temporary restrictions on imports of footwear described above, and the third is on 
motorcycles. There is no evidence that this pattern of safeguards affecting large amounts of imports 
has continued; Argentina’s new TTB use through the 2000s has become focused even more on 
antidumping. Countervailing duty actions had only a trivial affect throughout the period. 
 
5 Argentine Use of Antidumping against China and Brazil 
  The number of Argentine antidumping petitions against China has risen steadily. This 
complicates ascertaining how much of the recent rise in antidumping actions is a consequence of the 
economic crisis versus a growing concern about increased Chinese exports to Argentina. Table 7 
includes a simple count of unique HS-08 product line imports from China affected by Argentina’s 
antidumping actions during 1995-2010. Cases against Brazil, which earlier had been the focus of 
Argentine AD actions, are included for comparison. The table also includes the sectors (with counts 
aggregated up to the HS-02 level) most frequently involved in antidumping for each country. 
Column 2 indicates that the Brazilian exporters have been involved in 111 total initiations at the case 
level compared to 181 for China. However, there are many more Chinese investigations, not yet 
completed at the time of this study, compared to Brazil, which reflects the rash of cases against 
China in 2009-10.  
Brazilian cases are concentrated in the 1995-2001 period soon after the implementation of 
MERCOSUR obligations. In addition, Argentina focused on basic iron and steel (HS-02 sector 72), 
with 35 cases initiated during this period, 34 of which ended in a final antidumping measure. The 22 
 
vast majority of these cases were in only two steel sector investigations: ‘hot-rolled steel’ initiated in 
1998 and ‘cold-rolled steel’ initiated in 1999, each of which involved multiple individual HS lines 
combined into a single antidumping investigation. In subsequent periods, AD actions against Brazil 
were scattered across various HS sectors with no particular pattern. Furthermore, Argentine 
investigations against its primary MERCOSUR partner have slowed to a trickle by the end of the 
2000s. 
Perhaps most striking is that Argentine authorities imposed antidumping orders on Chinese 
exporters in 87% of the cases during 2002-7 and 100% of the cases in 2008-10 for which there is a 
final antidumping decision.
24 Some of the cases in the latter period have not yet reached the final 
stage but 100% of the preliminary decisions during this timeframe have resulted in at least 
temporary restrictions. In short, the 2002-10 period shows that Chinese firms always lose 
antidumping petitions in Argentina. 
Another notable comparison vis-à-vis Brazil is that there is a wide distribution of sectors 
involved in Chinese AD cases; no particular sector stands out as with Brazilian steel imports. The 
largest single group of cases (30) is in footwear but this simply reflects the large number of product 
lines in one particular antidumping investigation in 2009. Moreover, there is not a single case against 
Chinese exports of basic iron and steel (HS-02 sector 72) but numerous cases involving electrical 
and mechanical machinery. The implication seems clear: Argentine industries and authorities have 
concerns about a wide variety of Chinese products. 
  The increasingly intense focus on China reflects its growing importance in Argentina’s 
international trade. Table 8 shows that overall manufacturing imports from China increased nearly 
twelve-fold from $0.6 billion in 1995 to a high of $7.1 billion in 2008. This compares to about a 
three-fold increase in Argentina’s imports from all sources, from $19.8 billion to $54 billion for the 
same time period, which closely matches that sourced from Brazil, Argentina’s largest import source 
throughout the period of analysis. In sharp contrast, US and EU-15 exports to Argentina rose only 
slightly in nominal terms. In short, China’s share of Argentina’s imports grew dramatically, both in 
terms of absolute levels and as a share of overall imports (from 3.1% in 1995 to over 13% in 2009). 
China was on the radar screen of those in Argentina concerned about import protection even before 
the global economic turmoil began in 2008. 
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  Even the increase in Chinese imports described above underestimates the increased potential 
importance of Chinese market penetration given Argentina’s already widespread antidumping use 
against them. The observed share of Chinese products subject to Argentine antidumping actions 
went from $3.5 million in 1995 to over $348 million in 2010 (though this latter figure reflects cases 
for which no final decisions have been made). In the absence of such AD actions, Chinese exports 
to Argentina would undoubtedly have been larger. 
  Figure 6 shows the dramatic increase in Chinese exports to Argentina as well as the ramped 
up use of antidumping by Argentine authorities. Total Argentine imports from China remained 
relatively flat through most of the 1990s, with a notable decrease after the economic trauma 
following the peso devaluation of 2002. Subsequently, imports from China have risen steadily before 
falling again in 2009, though to a still higher level than they had been in 2007.  
  The share of Chinese imports subject to Argentine antidumping measures closely follows the 
overall import pattern, with the notable exception of 2003 when over 18% of Chinese products sold 
in Argentina involved antidumping actions. While the total percentage fell in the latter part of that 
decade, Chinese imports subject to antidumping orders have once again reached over 12% during 
the post-financial crisis period.  
   
6 Other Measures of Recent Argentine Trade Policy 
  Argentina may also restrict imports through other means. I first briefly consider the average 
applied tariffs across sectors in Argentina. Naturally, this gives an indication of how imports are 
affected through traditional tariffs rather than temporary measures that are the focus of this paper.   
Recall that Figure 1 included the annual average (unweighted) applied MFN tariffs for all 
sectors, which rose from 11.5% in 1995 -7 to 13% in 1998-2001. This corresponds to the pressures 
associated with real exchange rate appreciation during the period in which the peso was pegged to 
the dollar. Subsequently, average tariffs fell consistently from 2003 (11.8%) until 2008. There was a 
small uptick in 2009 when it reached 9% but this is still lower than in any year other than 2008. 
Thus, the Argentine government may have increased its imposition of antidumping measures in 
2007-10, but this has not been accompanied by broad increases in applied MFN duties. This is 
despite the fact that Argentina’s tariffs remain far below their bound rates so that there is significant 
tariff overhang.  24 
 
  However, given the provisions of MERCOSUR, it is important to note that Argentina’s 
tariffs are not set in a vacuum. In particular, any changes to Argentina’s applied tariffs in principle 
should be coordinated with movements in the common external tariffs (CET) as laid out by the 
customs union’s rules. Argentina might have preferred to have higher tariffs than allowed in the 
CET, or even lower. Thus, an analysis of the CET admits only imperfect interpretation of 
Argentina’s particular preferences for MFN tariffs. In addition, the increase in the number of 
MERCOSUR preferential trade agreements (such as with Colombia) means that the effective 
average tariff is below the one calculated here. 
  There have been other ways through which Argentina has restricted imports during 2008-10, 
though with a much less certain trade effect. For example, the US Department of Commerce has 
compiled a list of Argentina’s public notifications of new non-automatic import licenses and noted 
an important increase after October 2008. In 2009, there were at least 200 such notifications at the 
HS-08 level, 93 of which were in the textiles sector (HS-02 sectors 50 through 63) and in electrical 
and mechanical machinery sectors (HS-02 sectors 84 and 85). Other opaque measures cataloged by 
Global Trade Alert include, for example, reference prices for imports.
25  
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to ascertain how restrictive these import license regimes and 
reference prices are since they depend on the bureaucratic implementation of each license. At the 
very least, this increases the uncertainty under which importers operate in Argentina, which in turn is 
likely to decrease trade.   
     
7 Conclusions 
  Argentina has gone back and forth in its commitment towards an economy open to 
international competition. For decades, Argentina pursued import substitution policies. Its 
government became a star example of economic liberalisation in the 1990s when it reduced tariffs 
and generally embraced the strictures of the ‘Washington Consensus’. After the trauma of the peso 
crisis in 2001 and 2002, Argentina turned its back once again on a fully open system and began to 
take important actions to reinsert the government into the economy. This ultimately shallow 
commitment to a liberal trade regime raised the question of how Argentina would respond to the 
economic pressures associated with the global economic crisis that began in 2008.   
                                                        
25 See Argentina: Reference Prices for drinking glasses (2010) and Argentina: Reference Prices for designated imports 
(2010) at Global Trade Alert. 25 
 
  This paper makes clear that Argentina has relied heavily on antidumping as a means of 
limiting imports since the mid-1990s, with only very limited reliance on countervailing duty and 
safeguards throughout the period (and no use at all since 2007). As Nogues and Baracat (2006) 
pointed out, the Argentine government used antidumping in only a very limited fashion during the 
early 1990s. This ability to withstand the intense pressures for protection has broken down in the 
2000s, as is evidenced by the case of antidumping. In particular, antidumping petitions have been 
approved more frequently by the government and the imposed measures have longer lives. While 
roughly 50% of petitions were ‘approved’ in the 1990s, this rate has ratcheted up steadily to 85% in 
the 2006-8 period. This caused 2.7% of all observed Argentine imports to be affected by 
antidumping by 2009. Once the suppressed trade that occurs because of the highly restrictive actions 
is taken into account, trade in these sectors might have been twice as much in the absence of 
antidumping actions.  
  The most notable change in Argentina has been the dramatically larger role that imports 
from China have played in its application of temporary trade barriers. Chinese exports are far more 
likely to be subject to Argentine antidumping actions than their overall import share would suggest. 
In 2007-10, Chinese exporters targeted by Argentine antidumping were virtually guaranteed to face 
significant trade barriers as a result. Indeed, the estimate provided here suggests that by 2009, over 
13% of all Chinese exports to Argentina were affected by antidumping, either by new petitions or 
the ongoing effects of orders that were imposed in earlier years.   
  This increased focus on China has occurred simultaneously with the economic crisis. It is 
therefore difficult to determine whether this more intense targeting of China would have happened 
in the absence of the global financial meltdown. Because the increased Argentine targeting of China 
in temporary trade barrier cases began before the crisis, there is no reason to believe that it would 
change even after the Argentine and world economies have regained their footing. Nonetheless, 
there is relatively little evidence that Argentina has responded to the global financial crisis by 
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(% of GDP)b 
Antidumping 
Initiationsc 
1991  12.7  6.5  1.43  -0.2  1 
1992  11.9  7.1  1.36  -2.8  14 
1993  5.9  11.7  1.37  -3.4  28 
1994  5.8  14.4  1.46  -4.3  18 
1995  -2.8  18.9  1.49  -2.0  25 
1996  5.5  19.1  1.44  -2.5  24 
1997  8.1  15.9  1.35  -4.0  13 
1998  3.9  14.7  1.41  -4.8  6 
1999  -3.4  16.2  1.37  -4.2  21 
2000  -0.8  17.4  1.30  -3.1  26 
2001  -4.4  20.7  1.26  -1.4  33 
2002  -10.9  20.8  4.51  8.5  10 
2003  8.8  14.5  4.32  6.3  1 
2004  9.0  12.1  4.60  1.7  12 
2005  9.2  10.1  4.31  2.6  8 
2006  8.5  8.7  4.58  3.2  10 
2007  8.7  7.5  4.94  2.3  8 
2008  6.8  7.3  5.29  1.5  20 
2009  0.9  8.4  5.93  2.0  28 
Sources: a World Development Indicators; b IMF World Economic Outlook; c Bown (2010b) and 
Moore and Zanardi (2009). 
Notes: Exchange rate (nominal) = peso per special drawing right (SDR); AD initiations are at 
















Table 2: Argentina’s Initiated Antidumping Investigations (January 2008-March 2010) 
 
Target Country  Product    Initiation date 
Thailand  Air Conditioners  1/10/2008 
Brazil, Indonesia  Acrylic Yarns  3/25/2008 
Brazil, China  Stainless Steel Cutlery  4/25/2008 
China  Large Chains  4/28/2008 
China, Peru, Taiwan  Zippers  5/5/2008 
China, Romania  Oil Rigs  5/22/2008 
China  Cooling Liquid or Water for Engines  7/28/2008 
China, India  Dyes  7/29/2008 
China  Dishware  7/31/2008 
China  Steel Pipe Accessories  10/23/2008 
China, India, Indonesia, Taiwan  Polyester Fiber and Yarn  11/17/2008 
Brazil, China  Certain Taffeta Ligament Weft and Warp Fabrics  1/6/2009 
Brazil, China  Electric Food Processors  1/14/2009 
China, Germany, Switzerland  Laminated Floors  1/23/2009 
China  Footwear  3/2/2009 
China  Steel Wheels  3/9/2009 
Brazil, China  Stainless Steel Knives with Plastic Handles  3/20/2009 
China  Denim  3/25/2009 
Paraguay  Recordable Compact Discs  3/25/2009 
Brazil, China  Iron Pipe Accessories  5/14/2009 
China  Elevator and Forklift Engines  5/29/2009 
China  Lighters used in Kitchens  7/7/2009 
Brazil  Printing ink  7/14/2009 
India  Connectors for metal conductors  7/16/2009 
Brazil  Gas Compressors (except air)  9/9/2009 
China  Electric centrifugal pump  9/9/2009 
China  Syringes  9/9/2009 
China  Methane Chloride  9/24/2009 
China  Electric Heaters  10/19/2009 
China  Starting and Regulator Devices for Motorcycles  10/29/2009 
China  Steel Tubes  11/2/2009 
China  Electric Fans  11/24/2009 
China  Rubber Tires  12/17/2009 
Brazil  Polypropylene Fabric  2/11/2010 
China  Suits and Jackets  2/13/2010 
Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam  Air Conditioners  2/13/2010 
China  Chain Saw Blades  3/3/2010 
Source: Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010b). 30 
 
Table 3: Argentina’s AD Initiations and Measures Imposed* 
 
a. Initiations 
b. Final Measures Imposed** 
 
     1991-1994  1995-2001  2002-2007  2008-2010 
1991-2010  
Total 
China  7  38  20  57  122 
Brazil  24  59  9  6  98 
Other MERCOSUR  3  9  3  0  15 
EU-15  4  23  6  0  33 
USA  2  6  0  0  8 
Japan  3  4  0  0  7 
South Africa  0  42  8  0  50 
Korea  5  17  12  0  34 
Russia  0  33  0  0  33 
Kazakhstan  0  37  0  0  37 
Others  37  107  44  17  205 
Total  85  375  102  80  642 
Source: Author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010b). 








   1991-1994  1995-2001  2002-2007  2008-2010 
1991-2010  
Total 
China  7  46  23  112  188 
Brazil  56  82  12  17  167 
Other MERCOSUR  3  12  3  1  19 
EU-15  19  44  8  9  80 
USA  5  10  1  0  16 
Japan  3  4  0  0  7 
South Africa  0  46  8  0  54 
Korea  6  26  13  3  48 
Russia  0  33  8  0  41 
Kazakhstan  0  37  0  0  37 
Others  54  127  58  37  276 
Total  153  467  134  179  933 
           31 
 
Table 4: Argentina’s AD Initiations by HS-08-Country Pairs 





Clothing   Footwear 
Basic Iron 













(HS-02 90)  (HS-02 44)  (HS-02 62)  (HS-02 64)  (HS-02 72)  (HS-02 73)  (HS-02 82)  (HS-02 84)  (HS-02 85) 
1991  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 
1992  0  0  0  62  0  0  1  4  0 
1993  2  0  0  27  0  2  0  12  3 
1994  0  6  0  5  0  0  0  11  0 
1995  0  0  0  0  5  8  1  5  0 
1996  0  0  0  0  1  0  5  14  1 
1997  9  0  0  0  1  6  2  6  4 
1998  0  0  0  57  0  0  0  0  0 
1999  1  0  0  28  0  3  0  2  0 
2000  6  0  0  109  3  2  4  1  0 
2001  0  0  0  48  8  1  12  1  4 
2002  0  0  0  48  0  0  0  0  0 
2003  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
2004  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  5 
2005  0  0  0  0  2  2  0  0  1 
2006  0  0  0  0  0  4  2  3  3 
2007  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  7  0 
2008  0  0  0  0  3  8  7  0  0 
2009  29  0  30  0  9  2  8  8  3 
2010  0  11  0  0  0  2  12  0  0 
Total  47  17  30  384  33  40  54  75  25 32 
 
Table 5: Argentina’s Dumping and Material Injury Decisions* 
Note: Dumping and injury decisions are usually rendered in a year subsequent to the initiation. * Investigation level (eg footwear 
from China); withdrawn and terminated investigations are not included. 












































1995  25  15  60  10  40 
1996  23  14  61  7  30 
1997  13  12  92  10  77 
1998  6  5  83  5  83 
1999  21  20  95  20  95 
2000  33  28  85  23  70 
2001  26  24  92  21  81 
2002  10  9  90  7  70 
2003  1  1  100  1  100 
2004  12  12  100  9  75 
2005  8  8  100  7  88 
2006  10  10  100  6  60 
2007  7  7  100  7  100 
2008  19  19  100  18  95 




Table 6: Argentina’s Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Actions (since 1995) 
 
Countervailing Duty Measures  Targeted Country  Measure  Initiation year  Revocation year 
Peaches in Syrup  European Union  yes  1995  NA 
Vital Wheat Gluten  European Union  yes  1996  2006 
Virgin and Refined Olive Oil   European Union  yes  1997  2006 
         
Safeguard Measures         
Footwear     yes  1997  2000 
Toys     terminated  1998   
Footwear     yes  2000  2003 
Motorcycles     yes  2000  2004 
Peaches     yes  2001  2004 
Coloured Television Sets     yes  2004  2007 
Recordable Compact Discs     yes  2006  2010 
Source: Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010b). 34 
 
Table 7: Argentina’s Antidumping Cases against China and Brazil 
Note: Based on HS-08-country pairs; * HS-02 codes in parentheses. Note that many petitions filed in 2009 and 2010 have not yet reached a final decision. 
Source: Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010b). 





Initiations  Initiations 
New 
Measures  Initiations 
New 
Measures  Initiations  
New 
Measures 
Articles of Clothing (62)*  11  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Footwear (64)  30  0  0  0  0  30  30 
Articles of Iron and Steel (73)  18  5  5  3  3  3  3 
Tools (82)  15  8  8  0  0  4  4 
Mechanical Machinery (84)  18  10  9  0  0  2  2 
Electrical Machinery (85)  16  6  4  5  4  0  0 
Optical and Surgical Equipment (90)  11  2  0  6  6       
Others  62  15  12  9  7  12  12 
Total  181  46  38  23  20  51  51 
                     
Brazil                      
Meat (02)  5  5  2  0  0  0  0 
Articles of Wood (44)  6  6  0  0  0  0  0 
Basic Iron and Steel (72)  35  35  34  0  0  0  0 
Articles of Iron and Steel (73)  8  6  6  0  0  0  0 
Tools (82)  11  4  4  2  0  4  4 
Mechanical Machinery (84)  9  7  0  0  0  0  0 
Electrical Machinery (85)  12  8  6  3  3  0  0 
Others  25  11  7  7  6  2  2 
Total  111  82  59  12  9  6  6   35 






















1995  19.8  4.2  4.2  0.6  0.7  5.7  11.8  6.9 
1996  23.3  4.7  5.3  0.7  0.7  6.6  13.4  8.5 
1997  29.6  6.1  6.9  1.0  1.1  7.9  16.9  10.9 
1998  31.1  6.2  7.1  1.2  1.5  8.5  17.9  11.5 
1999  25.3  5.0  5.6  1.0  1.1  7.3  14.9  9.3 
2000  24.6  4.8  6.5  1.2  1.0  5.7  12.9  10.4 
2001  19.9  3.8  5.3  1.1  0.8  4.5  10.1  8.6 
2002  8.7  1.8  2.5  0.3  0.3  2.0  4.5  3.7 
2003  13.4  2.3  4.7  0.7  0.4  2.7  6.0  6.7 
2004  21.4  3.4  7.6  1.4  0.6  4.0  9.0  11.3 
2005  28.4  4.5  10.6  1.5  0.6  5.3  11.3  15.4 
2006  32.7  4.3  11.9  3.1  0.9  5.5  12.1  18.8 
2007  42.5  5.3  14.7  5.1  1.2  6.9  15.1  24.6 
2008  54.3  7.0  18.0  7.1  1.4  8.3  18.8  31.3 
2009  38.3  5.4  11.8  5.4  0.9  6.4  14.7  21.3   36 
 
Source: TRAINS database. 
 





























1995 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Tariff Rate
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TTB-affected sectors  37 
a. Initiations, by Target Country Group 
 
b. Orders in Place (Count of Country-HS-08 pairs) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010b). 
 






































Developing (excl. Brazil and China)
Developed  38 
 
a. Number of AD orders in effect by length of years 
 
Note: Duration is the difference between the year when measure is imposed and the year when 
revoked. For orders remaining in place in 2010, duration is measured by 2010 minus the year when 
the measure is invoked. 
 
 
b. Share of AD orders removed in 5 years 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010b). 
Note: Year is five years subsequent to the imposition of the original antidumping order.  
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Source: Author’s calculations using COMTRADE and Temporary Trade Barriers Database 
(Bown, 2010b). 
Note: Share based on stock of restrictions in place. 
 
Figure 4: Argentine Imports Affected by AD, CVD, and Safeguards 
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Source: Author’s calculations using COMTRADE and Temporary Trade Barriers Database 
(Bown, 2010b). 
Note: Share based on stock of restrictions in place. The two lines coincide in 2007-9. 
 














































Source: Author’s calculations using COMTRADE and Temporary Trade Barriers Database 
(Bown, 2010b). 
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place (RHS)